What is known in Iran today as the ‘Green Movement’ may be viewed as the product of years of continuous activity by the women’s, student, and worker’s movements alongside the country’s Reform movement. By keeping respect for existing political leaders [such as the Reformist presidential candidates], the Green Movement showed from the beginning that because it stems from civil movements and not political parties, it will not accept exclusive leadership by anyone. Musavi and Karrubi understand this quality of the movement and have never tried to position themselves as domineering leaders or “deciders.” They have limited their role to issuing declarations that express the society’s “minimum demands,” leaving a door open for compromise with the country’s current rulers and past officials. The following article will focus on the role, status, and significance of the student movement in the current protests.

A brief overview of the student movement’s course of ups and downs over the recent decade will help contextualize the current movement and events of June 2009.

The student movement—and at its heart, Daftar Tahkim-e Vahdat (the Office for the Consolidation of Unity) as one of the few student forces that has a structured organization—played a lead role in helping Mohammad Khatami’s Reformist administration come to office in 1997’s landslide election. Khatami won on a platform of pledges for political and social freedoms—but he soon went up against various crises; the Tehran University student uprising in 1999 was among the first victims of the Reform era. The students paid a heavy toll in that event and had a tough time rallying support for a second Khatami term.

The glaringly weak performance of the second Reformist administration, the ending of the reformist-dominated 6th Majlis (2000-4), council elections, and other obstacles injected a climate of despair and defeat among the student movement. Even Tahkim, whose organizational power was remarkable in making demands and protests widespread and universal across Iranian universities in dozens of cities, was left with nothing but a handful of veteran—and weary—student activists in Tehran and in suspended student councils. Political student activists gradually lost their sway in the university scene. This political climate had several results: student movement leaders going into a defensive lock, a growing split in demands between students in Tehran and provincial cities, and the non-participation of students from Azad University, a private university which has branches in almost all Iranian cities and towns.

The Ahmadinejad administration’s sweeping crackdown on student activists of all persuasions, from liberal to leftist, in the major universities in the capital, fostered passivity among students in relation to political and social affairs. Although some campuses –such as Amir Kabir and Tehran University –periodically staged symbolic protests in reaction to various events, even these rare cases did not carry the student movement’s former strength and impact.

During Ahmadinejad’s first term, universities like other social institutions, had grown weary of the Reformists’ rhetoric and worried instead about the new hardline administration’s pressures for shutting down cultural, social, and economical arenas. Universities tried to stay as far away from public affairs and focus only on student issues.

The tenth presidential election on June 12, 2009, contrary to everyone’s expectations, completely transformed the public mood.

Despite Tahkim’s decline and resulting lack of a strong organizational base and cohesive body of student organizers, the universities reflexively became the center for the voice of the “youth.” What was different this time was that the struggle was not grounded in a small circle of political activists but that all ordinary students entered the fray to demand their legal and universal rights—a factor we can note as the secret of the Green Movement.

But how did this transpire? A glance back at the events of the past eight months will reveal two main differences between current and past student protests:

1) The breadth and scale of protests

News from the universities tells us that unlike previous bouts of student protests that were largely confined to Tehran University, Amir Kabir, and Elm o Sanat (Iran University of Science and Technology), this time the protests are widespread, spanning public as well as private campuses nationwide. In many cities, demonstrations are staged spontaneously and independently. Examples include:

Shiraz University, Tabriz University, and Esfahan University:

Over 20 protest sessions against the ‘coup’ government—attacks on dormitories of all three universities by Ansar-e Hezbollah, a pro-regime vigilante group, and campus security forces – arrests of dozens of student activists, unprecedentedly severe disciplinary sentences, and telephone warnings to the families of more than 50 students.

Razi University in Kermanshah:

In addition to the issuing of severe disciplinary sentences for more than 30 student protesters, one Razi student—Miss Tahmasebi—was killed in the course of campus demonstrations on June 18^th, 2009.

Urmiyeh University:

Several campus demonstrations, the arrest of student activists and beating of student protesters, as well as attacks on the dormitories of female student protesters during the month of January 2010, put Urmiyeh in the news among provincial universities

Qazvin University:

Qazvin has shined in the past eight months, showing resilience in the face of arrests, as commendable footage of protests sent by this university attests.

Mashhad’s Ferdowsi University:

Ferdowsi has made headlines in student news by staging a massive demonstration simultaneously with Mashhad’s Azad University. The arrest of over 210 students in Mashhad on December 30, 2009 above all showed the regime’s desperation in dealing with student protests.

Babol University:

Following campus protests during June of 2009, 9 students received a 23-month jail sentences and 60-month suspended jail sentences, and 25 years of being barred from academic study. Additionally, 15 suspended sentences were handed out by the disciplinary committee.

Mazandaran University:

Three female student activists were expelled from their dormitories, 50 student protesters were sentenced by the disciplinary committee, and 28 students were given failing grades during the months of June and July of 2009. The student council center was shut down and five student activists were imprisoned.

Gilan University:

Protests were so numerous at this university that the disciplinary committee expelled 68 students and barred them from future academic study.

Shahroud University:

Previously, Shahroud University had no significant record of political activism. In the immediate post-election aftermath, Shahroud saw mass protests by students during the month of June.

Ilam University:

Several students were arrested

Ahvaz’s Chamran University:

Over a series of protests, Ahvaz students denounced the government as illegitimate and gave a boisterous reception to a visiting governmental representative on October 29, 2009—an act that earned 100 students disciplinary sentences.

If we add to these examples from provincial cities,Tehran campus protests at Sharif, Khajeh Nasir, Shahid Beheshti, Elm o Sanat, Amir Kabir, Al Zahra, Azad, and Tehran University, we will get a sense of the breadth and scale of the post-election student demonstrations.

2) The structure of student protester groups

The scale of protests in the face of the aforementioned decline of political organizations and student organizers on campuses and the spate of arrests and disciplinary committee sentences shows the extent to which the student movement operates autonomously and spontaneously.

This time students did not stage protests under the banner of Takhim or their university’s Islamic student council, but protested according to their individual demands. Although it seems that the “right” political actions will bear results only when backed by a robust organized structure, Musavi and Karrubi’s approaches and stances—summarized in their motto “every Iranian is a media outlet”—suggests that the Green Movement does not have a representative leader and that all Iranians function as leaders and representatives of and within the movement.

The movement has thus demonstrated novel and extraordinary dynamics: the more the regime security apparatus arrests political leaders and thinkers, the more protesters are drawn to the cause and continue undiminished.

It can be said that the student movement, over the past eight months, has played its role and function admirably and will surely continue to do so. The question is: are Iran’s other civil society movements present and active at their fullest capacity in the Green Movement?