The unprecedented violence in Iran seen in the December 27 Ashura protests—which was committed by the regime and the opposition—showcased the emboldened opposition movement’s capacity for civil disobedience as well as a decline in both the psychological and physical effectiveness of the regime’s repressive security forces.

While nine protesters were slain and dozens injured, protesters managed to corner the black-clad anti-riot guards that Iranians call “Robocops,” capture and disarm a number of security forces, knock basij forces off motorbikes, and set fire to police vehicles. For many Iranians, Ashura marked a milestone in the opposition’s tenacity and scale. However, the dynamics that have sustained the anti-government movement this far, although well-developed, have led to a glaring deficiency that is beginning to raise concerns.

The opposition, which relies on a decentralized grassroots network (both web-based and at a local level) for organization and communication, faces the danger of erosion once the current strategy of staging demonstrations on a pre-set “calendar” (December’s Ashura, November’s Students Day, September’s Jerusalem Day, and the upcoming 1979 revolution anniversary in February) runs out of dates. This is especially a problem, as isolated protests are unlikely to pressure Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the hard-line ruling bloc to back down. It is likely that if the opposition’s campaign fails to yield a resolution by the one-year mark of the 2009 elections, the impetus to go on may peter out or the movement may abandon its principle of nonviolence and be driven underground and radicalized into armed struggle.