The Islamic Republic has on the whole been good at producing political theatre. Its establishment knows that politics can be a form of entertainment and that Iranians enjoy a good show. Unlike the shah, who always appeared uncomfortable with politics, the establishment of the Islamic Republic has tended to understand its utility. The sudden scandal, the rumour and, best of all, the “trial” have all helped to preoccupy the inquisitive and perhaps reassure the sceptics that politics remains alive, if not necessarily well, in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The paradox of the current administration in Iran, and in particular the character of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is that they want it both ways. They want the theatre but they also want total control, not only of the production, but of the audience reaction. In so doing they have singularly failed to manufacture consent and have been struggling since the election on 12 June to impose their narrative.

The last few days have offered good examples of the difficulties faced by this particular paranoid state. On Saturday, the hardline establishment decided to produce a spectacular show trial with the requisite confessions in an obvious attempt to convince people that the narrative of the velvet revolution they have been peddling is for real. Quite apart from the images of humiliated prisoners that will have angered many, it was the extraordinarily broad indictment which drew the most damning criticism from the opposition, including many in Qom who lambasted the government for ignoring the very legal procedures it had been urging on others. Interestingly, the news anchor who blithely conducted the “poolside” chat with the repentant protesters has had to close his blog because of a torrent of public abuse.

Mohsen Rezai, a defeated candidate and the former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, pointedly noted that the judiciary ought to convene a court to try those who had actually murdered Iranian citizens. He, too, joined the boycott of the inauguration.

If anything the situation has become more polarised and the rhetoric increasingly bitter, particularly from the opposition. But now the language of treason is being used with alarming frequency and many hardliners have suddenly become aware that they have no monopoly on vitriolic language. None of this bodes well for the future. What started as an election dispute has moved on to engulf the very structures of the Islamic Republic.